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Abstract 
 
It is perhaps a truism to note that ‘the consumer’ is but a role that is played by human subjects. This 
insight leaves us, as lawyers, with one vital question: how can or does the legal system meaningfully 
rationalise its encounters with the consumer? Can it, and if so to what way, shape the act of 
consumption? Can it even ensure that the ‘fact’ of consumption translates into ‘good’ normative 
institutions.  
In a summarizing account of legal encounters with the consumer since the era of laissez-faire 
liberalism we seek to show that this potential does exist within the constitutional state. However, as 
markets, political systems and consumers have broken free from national communities we need to 
ask: will the achievements of constitutional democracies survive Europeanisation and Gliobalisation? 
In our assessment of current trends in the EU we diagnose a seemingly paradoxical alliance between 
a new orthodoxy of neo-liberalism within market relations and a de-legalisation of regulatory 
policies. At international level, our analysis is restricted to a single case (namely, the recent report of 
a WTO Panel on the controversy over Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs). >It has become 
increasingly clear that the notion of a international consumer interest has been reduced to one of 
health and safety that is identified and secured with simple recourse to ‘scientific expertise’. ‘Sound 
science’ has become transnationally binding yardstick that both orients and limits consumer policy. 
The vision of a ‘consumer citizen’, who would actively participate in the transformation of 
consumption into a normative ‘good’, has become a matter of utopian history. 
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1. Introduction 
It is perhaps a truism to note that the ‘consumer’ is not a human subject, but is instead a 
role that is played by human subjects. By the same token, however, the act of 
consumption can never be fully understood in isolation – as an autonomous act of 
personal volition – but must likewise be viewed through interactive lenses: 
consumption occurs within and is both shaped by and shaping of a series of social 
institutions and systems, which possess their own varied rationales. Thus, the act of 
consumption makes up only one determining component within a market exchange 
system that is also inexorably shaped by a profit motive, and is further facilitated or 
constrained by the technical or social realities of manufacturing and production. 
Similarly, consumption may impact upon or be informed by cultural, political and 
economic institutions. A simple ‘buy British campaign’, for example, entails a complex 
combination of social, political and economic impulses: an appeal (successful or 
otherwise) to sentiments of ‘national community’, a political desire to maintain the 
national manufacturing base, as well as a co-ordinated economic effort to satisfy 
‘national’ consumption demands within ‘national’ production and marketing systems. 
The deceptively complex or interactive nature of consumption – the partially-
autonomous and partially-dependent role that is played by the consumer – in its turn 
raises interesting questions about the law that ‘governs’ consumer matters. At the 
simplest level, the law’s relationship with consumption is most commonly distilled 
down to a notion of ‘consumer protection’; ‘consumer law’ is surely dedicated to 
ensuring that the act of consumption is not only safe, but is also one which is ‘fair’ to 
consumer expectations. Ubiquitous though this simple consumer protection formulation 
may be, however, it barely begins to describe the true complexity that characterises the 
interrelationships that are established between the act of consumption and the whole of 
any one legal order, be that order national, supranational or transnational in nature. Law, 
                                                          
*
  An earlier version of this essay was presented at the workshop on ‘Citizenship and Consumption: 
Agency, Norms, Mediations, and Spaces’ on 30 March – 1 April 2006, Trinity Hall, University of 
Cambridge. The workshop was one in a series of events organised in the context of the research on 
‘Cultures of Consumption’ directed by Frank Trentmann, Birkbeck College, University of London. 
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after all, is also a social institution, an independent system with its own governing 
rationale made up of its own norms, prescriptions and simple procedural rules within 
which consumers must act and with which consumers interact: law may accordingly be 
viewed as a constraint upon autonomous acts of consumption, dictating the normative 
frameworks within which the role of consumer is played out; alternatively, it may also 
be considered to be a weapon, which consumers might also deploy, in order to 
determine for themselves the particular normative parameters within which 
consumption can occur.1 
The particular degree of complexity that characterises the relationship that is 
established between the law and the consumer explains the choice of title for this essay. 
As we will demonstrate, all the while distancing ourselves from a simple ‘consumer 
law’ approach to the protection of the consumer, legal orders do not simply directly 
further or restrain acts of consumption. Rather, individual legal orders ‘encounter’ the 
consumer in a variety of legal contexts (from contract law to competition law to labour 
regulation and to risk regulation) and are likewise guided by a variety of potentially 
conflicting rationales on the nature, purpose or role of consumption within any one 
social, political or economic arena. For example, acting to guard against labour 
exploitation, or to defend traditional forms of manufacturing and production, a legal 
order may act to the detriment of a perceived ‘consumer interest’ in, say, unrestricted 
outlet opening hours and the provision of cheap, if merely utilitarian, goods. At the 
same time, however, the same legal order may also appear to pander to an inveterate 
consumer interest in the provision of affordable and diverse goods, promoting and 
sustaining a competition law order that fiercely regulates any private restrictions on 
freedom of trade. 
The complex and contradictory nature of the relationship established between law and 
consumption has been attributed to the fact that the role of ‘consumer’ is only one of 
many roles played by any one human agent.2 In other words, a consumer is never just a 
consumer, but is also a worker, producer of goods or economic agent, always with 
varied goals in mind. Equally, however, the law is never simply law, but is, likewise, 
labour law, consumer law, contract law or general economic regulation, with its own 
distinct regulatory goals. Seen in this light, it seems appropriate to doubt whether it is 
possible to identify any coherent categorisation of legal encounters with the consumer. 
Nonetheless, at the level of national legal orders, characterised by dense historical 
interaction between the many identities or roles adopted by national citizens, and 
further marked by dialogue between the varied parts of national legal orders, we can 
tentatively identify three legal encounters with the consumer, which translate into three 
concrete legal conceptions of the nature and purpose of consumption, albeit that each 
                                                          
1
  See, for example, Frank Trentmann’s historical investigation of the ‘consumer revolution’ and the 
mode in which consumers might organize themselves as a distinct political class in order to influence 
legal regulation, ‘The Modern Geneology of the Consumer: Meanings, Identities and Political 
Synapses’, in J. Brewer & F. Trentmann, Consuming Cultures, Global Perspectives: Historical 
Trajectories, Transnational Exchanges (Oxford: Berg Publishing: 2006), pp. 19-70. 
2
  J. Q. Whitman, ‘Cosumerism, Producerism and Comparative Law, Manuscript, Yale University 2006; 
see also, M. Bevir & F. Trentmann, ‘Markets in historical contexts: ideas, practices and governance’, 
in id, (eds. ), Markets in Historical Contexts: Ideas and Politics in the Modern World (Cambridge: 
CUP 2004), 1-24; G. Trumbull, Consumer Capitalism Politics, Product Markets, and Firm strategy in 
France and Germany (Ithaca-London: Cornell UP 2006), pp. 161-178. 
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are subjected to their own internal inconsistencies: the ‘sovereign-consumer’; the 
‘citizen-consumer’; and the ‘enabled consumer’. 
It is the initial purpose of this essay to describe each of these legal encounters with and 
conceptions of consumption within a national historical context. Consumer law 
emerged in tandem with the secular emergence of the Western European state and is 
best understood within the national constellation. Now, however, it requires urgent re-
elaboration within postnational and transnational analytical frameworks.3 It is no longer 
adequate to conceive of modern law or the modern act of consumption in purely 
national terms. Most visibly, both consumers and lawyers have been able to spring the 
normative confines of national states by virtue of the activities of supranational and 
transnational organisations such as the European Union (EU) and World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). Where the act of consumption, as well as the law that shaped it, 
might once have been postulated in terms of the ‘common’ goals of the nation state, as 
well as its comprehensive (or nationally integrated) legal order, consumers now act 
within or interact with ‘partial legal/economic orders’ dedicated to very specific 
supranational or transnational goals, such as the establishment of an effective European 
market or the enabling of global trade. At one level, this has given rise to considerable 
political tension as post-national legal orders, more particularly, the WTO, are 
perceived of as promoting one particular and seemingly truncated (US brokered) notion 
of consumption, ‘consumerism’, to the detriment of conflicting producer, labour or 
financial interests in various parts of the globe.4 At a far deeper or legal theory, level, 
however, the notion of the global consumer has also posed great challenges to the 
discipline of law, and has further raised manifold doubts, both about the effectiveness 
of global legal regulation of consumer affairs, and about the legitimacy of legal 
encounters with the consumer at global level. 
Within the national setting, although legal encounters with the consumer were also 
inevitably marked by contradiction as the varied roles played by national citizens 
(consumer versus worker versus producer) conflicted with one another, the notion of 
national identity (shared national economic and social goals), established and secured 
by national democratic process, lent legal encounters with and conceptions of 
consumption an air of integrative legitimacy. In the modern post-national setting, 
however, contradictions and conflicts within legal encounters with the consumer raise 
particular doubts about the ability of law to continue to provide an integrative force 
within modern society. Habermas’ famous query of whether democracy will survive 
globalisation5 comprises the legacy of the consumer citizen. Within national societies, 
                                                          
3
  See for a concise summary of pertinent debates in political science S. Leibfried & M. Zürn, 
‘Reconfiguring he national constellation’, in id., (eds.), Transformations of the State (Cambridge: 
CUP 2005), pp.1-36.  
4
  See, J. Q. Whitman (note 2), citing an article in Le Figaro on the global threat of US ‘consumerism’ 
(S. Devillers & P.-O. Julien, ‘Leur anti-américanisme ne nuit pas au success des marques de l’Oncle 
Sam, Ces jeunes qui aiment Nike mais pas L’Amerique’, Le Figaro, August 1st, 2002). Clearly, such 
denunciations are fuelled by the perception that unregulated individual consumption undermines a 
joint social belief in the value of certain goods that is established by virtue of the mode in which they 
are produced. 
5
  J. Habermas, ‘Die postnationale Konstellation und die Zukunft der Demokratie’, in id., Die 
postnationale Konstellation. Politische Essays (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 1998), pp. 91-169 [=‘The 
Postnational Constellation and the Future of Democracy’, in The Postnational Constellation. Political 
Essays (Cambridge-Oxford: Polity-Blackwell 2001), pp. 58-112]. 
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we have witnessed a transformation, however gradual, tentative and contentious, of the 
‘fact’ of consumption into a normative ‘good’, which is now challenged by 
international institutions – but which may in turn be challenging the legitimacy claims 
of these institutions.  
In the following we aim to illustrate these points in a work of three acts. Firstly, we 
shall delve back into legal history to investigate the three ideal-type paradigms of the 
consumer that have been established under national law and within national legal theory. 
Secondly, we shall demonstrate how post-national consumption, within the EU context, 
has begun to unravel what were once fairly integrated notions of nature of consumption. 
We will also underline, however, that the EU has learned a lesson of presumably 
principled importance about the dependence of its liberalising market-building project 
on a concomitant development first of consumer protection policies and then of the 
consumer as political citizen. Thirdly and finally, we shall turn to globalisation. That is 
in terms of our theoretical endeavours a widely uncharted sea. We will therefore do 
what lawyers are best equipped to do, namely highlight the contemporary challenge 
with a contemporary case: the recent panel report on the dispute between the US and 
the EU on Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs).6 That case, we will argue, is of 
exemplary importance – and if we are right with that assumption the prospects of the 
global citizen consumer are gloomy. 
 
 
2. A Brief Historical Reconstruction of Legal Encounters with the Consumer 
As noted above, the legal relationship with the act of consumption is complex and often 
contradictory, characterised both by conflict between the varied roles played by any one 
individual (consumer, artisan, worker, producer) and by the great difficulties which any 
one legal order faces when seeking to reconcile the varied policy goals pursed by each 
individual area of law (contract law, labour law, competition law and economic 
regulation). Nonetheless, within the historical national setting, we can identify three 
‘ideal-type’ legal encounters with consumption, giving rise to a threefold legal 
categorisation of the consumer: ‘the sovereign-consumer’; the ‘citizen-consumer’; and 
the enabled consumer’. 
In other words, though by no means comprehensively so, the nation state has 
traditionally proven to be a forum within which national polities evolve their own 
distinctive visions of the legitimate purpose of the normative good of consumption. In 
its turn, each such version is translated (though necessarily imperfectly so) into national 
law. As such, law may be portrayed as having a transformative effect upon the act of 
consumption and the role of the consumer. By this token, the law of the nation state is 
afforded an integrative role. It is assumed to be able to ameliorate stark distinctions 
                                                          
6
  See EC — Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/Interim, 
WT/DS292/Interim, WT/DS293 (complaints by United States, Canada and Argentina respectively) 13 
October 2006; available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news06_e/291r_e.htm; for the 
preliminary confidential report leaked by Friends of the earth cf. http://www.foe.co.uk/resources/ 
press_releases/leaked_wto_report_us_misle_28022006.html. 
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between views of the nature and purpose of consumption, in order to transform simple 
acts of consumption into a shared (national) normative good.7 Nonetheless, as we shall 
demonstrate, even this (national) integrative role has its own limits; and not the least 
since legal theory teaches us that legal orders are themselves autonomous social 
institutions, with their own underlying visions of which legal interventions into the act 
of consumption are legitimate and when. 
 
The Freedom to Consume: Formal law and the ‘Sovereign-Consumer’ 
The notion of US ‘consumerism’ has a modern air to it. Nonetheless, consumerism – or 
the concept that the act of consumption possesses its own egalitarian force – has deep 
historical roots within very many national legal orders, and more particularly, within 
19th Century (European) legal notions of contractual justice and equality, which, 
although unable to recognise consumers as a distinct legal class, nonetheless assumed 
that contractual partners (or consumers) were fit and able to determine their own 
destinies.8 Switzerland is a not so often cited case in point:  
‘Die Ablehnung eines Sondergesetzes für Kaufleute stehe ‘mit den demokratischen 
Staatseinrichtungen in der Schweiz und mit der demokratischen Gesinnung des 
Schweizervolkes im Zusammenhang, vermöge deren es jeder Sonderstellung eines 
Berufstandes entschieden abgeneigt’ sei.9 
The cited 1879 declaration of the Swiss Bundesrat, rejecting the introduction of a 
special law for the sale of goods within Switzerland, furnishes us with our first glimpse 
of an abiding form of encounter between law and the consumer (better-stated ‘non-
consumer’), which is governed, not by any legal desire specifically to identify and 
support consumers within the economy, but rather by a happy coincidence between 
law’s ancient mission to preserve its own (pre-political) legitimacy through the 
maintenance of ‘formal legal rationality’ and the economic and social rationales and 
theories that underpinned emerging European nation states. 
As Max Weber teaches us, the modern law of the western nation state was to be 
distinguished from its natural or charismatic forebears by virtue of its refusal to embody 
or promote any one anthropological or substantive vision of the legitimate nature of 
human organisation. Instead, the legitimacy of law derived from its neutral mission to 
provide a formal framework of norms within which all human agents were assumed to 
                                                          
7
  See for an early description of the need to integrate the varying and various interests of national 
citizens within national politics and national law C. Offe, ‘Ausdifferenzierung oder Integration’, in G. 
Fleischmann (ed.), Der Kritische Verbraucher (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus 1981), pp. 259-276.. 
8
  See, D. Bollier & J. Claybrook, Freedom from Harm (Washington, D.C.: Public Citizen Project: 
Washington 1986), a classic work making a stark distinction between the freedom to consume and a 
notion of consumption, which places a far greater emphasis upon the need to ensure that individual be 
free from harm during the act of consumption. 
9
  See, E.A.Kramer, ‚Zur Konzeption des Konsumentenschutzes’, 2 (1986) Kritische Vierteljahreschrift 
für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft, pp. 270-290 at 286. see, also M. Amstutz, A. Abbegg & V. 
Karavas, Soziales Vertragsrecht. Eine rechtsevolutorische Studie (Basel: Helbing & Lichtenhahn 
2006), pp. 13 ff. 
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be willing and able to act of their own volition.10 The cornerstone of such a theory of 
legal legitimation was in turn formed by a private law doctrine of contractual privacy, 
which precluded any legal intervention within economic exchange relationships that 
might be motivated by interventionist efforts to secure the particular status of any one 
contractual party (as consumer, worker etc…). In other works, the inspirational power 
underlying a formally rational legal refusal to recognise the consumer as a distinct legal 
class, lay in the belief that once a formal legal framework had been established that 
would apply equally to all, regardless of status, the individual autonomy and creative 
power of all citizens would be assured, leaving them free to pursue productive 
economic activity in service of the economy. 
By the same token, however, formal rationality was to find much favour within 
emerging nation states, dedicated both to the destruction of the feudal or status-based 
relationships, which had seemingly retarded the economic and social development of 
their aristocratic or hierarchical forebears, as well as to the promulgation of the new and 
integrative powers of the national economy: 
‘Die Einheitskonzeption (unity of contract law) rechfertige sich auch ‘durch die wohl in 
keinem anderen Lande Europas in so hohem Grade durch alle Schichten der Gesellschaft 
gleichmässig verbreitete Schulbildung und geschäftliche Begabung des Volkes’.11  
In other words, classical economic theory, the growing political preference for 
bourgeois patterns of social organisation, as well as the national imperative for creative 
economic development, acted in concert to support and sustain formal legal notions of 
contractual autonomy, which assumed that individual volition, or individual ‘economic 
sovereignty’, formed both the legitimate basis for law and for the foundation of an 
egalitarian society. Within such an egalitarian society, the legally secured economic 
freedom ‘to act within the market’ would both sustain and be sustained by national 
solidarity and would further unleash creative forces of political and economic 
consolidation. The imputed social distinctions of the feudal economy had been 
superseded. As a consequence, formal law would refuse directly to recognise a distinct 
class of consumers. Nonetheless, a freedom to consume would be enshrined within the 
legal order and further be supported by the ideology of the emerging nation state, which 
deemed the character of the ‘national citizen’ - and above all, the ‘talented’ national 
economic citizen’ - to be both a force for the creation of egalitarian social organisation 
and a potent weapon within the effort to evolve the national economy. 
The inspirational power that lies behind formal egalitarian conceptions of ‘the freedom 
to consume’, or the notion of contractual sovereignty, provides us with an explanation 
for the fact that whilst most European states have long since dispensed with their firm 
belief in the notion of ‘given’ economic equality, and have long since intervened to 
regulate once private contractual relations, traces of the 19th Century conception of 
                                                          
10
  The cornerstone of Weberian formal legal rationality was provided by the ability of a modern and 
formal law to furnish and secure the intimacy and certainty of market-place across the whole of an 
advanced industrial economy, see his Rechtssoziologie (edited by J.Winckelmann, Neuwied-
Berlin::Luchterhand, 2nd ed. 1967, e.g. pp. 123-126. 
11
  E.A. Kramer (note 9), p. 286. 
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formal equality can still be found in most European private legal orders. 12  Most 
strikingly, however, ‘the freedom to consume’ and, with it, a notion of the ‘sovereign 
consumer’, now finds its most powerful contemporary expression within the 
‘consumerism’ that is attributed to a peculiarly US conception of the nature and purpose 
of world trade orders.13 
Alternatively, whilst the simple assumption that individual autonomy can be secured by 
the blanket application of one set of legal norms to all parties may appear outmoded, 
both within the law itself and within wider society,14 the inspirational roots of consumer 
sovereignty still live on within a rhetoric of consumer choice, that is, in its modern form, 
underpinned by a legal framework of individual legal rights. Seen in this light, US 
consumerism is not simply an expression of ‘cultural rootlessness’,15 a ‘meaningless’ 
consumerism within which the urge and ability to purchase unravels any deep-seated 
cultural or social perceptions about the nature of ‘valued’ goods, but is instead, an echo 
of the egalitarianism and belief in the self-determining powers of egalitarian identity 
politics, which marked the birth of the modern western state. To the ‘consumerist’ legal 
order, the notion of rights is determinative: evident weaknesses in formal legal 
rationality – the simple abuse of economic, political and social power within contractual 
relations16 – can be compensated for by the recognition in higher (constitutional) law 
that all must be treated equally, regardless of race, religion or national origin. By the 
same token, modern neo-classical economic theory, together with the self-determining 
and socially-creative purchasing power of once disregarded minorities, such as women, 
blacks and gays,17 imbue the consumerist economy with an egalitarianism all of its own. 
In this secnario, ‘valued goods’ are, thus, not the simple creation of unthinking and 
possibly prejudicial traditional values and social relations, but are, rather, an immediate 
market response to the needs and self-expressed identities of ‘sovereign consumers’. 
 
Freedom from Harm: Material Law and the ‘Citizen-Consumer’ 
Although the notion of the ‘sovereign-consumer’ may be thought to be most closely 
identified with the US legal arena, evidence for the contention that legal encounters 
with the consumer are highly complex indeed, can also be derived from history and 
                                                          
12
  See, for a historical examination of the disruptive tendencies of modern private law to translate 
interventionist regulation into older former legal frameworks to which they are not suited, Ch. Joerges, 
Verbraucherschutz als Rechtsproblem (Heidelberg: Verlagsgesellschaft Recht und Wirtschaft, 1981). 
13
  J. Q. Whitmann (note 2). 
14
  Formal law was largely superceded by interventionist regulation in a post-war period. For the full 
evolution of interventionist and substantive legal encounters with the consumer within this period, see, 
M. Everson, ‘Legal Constructions of the Consumer , in F. Trentman (ed.), The Making of the 
Consumer Knowledge, Power and Identity in the Modern World (Oxford-New York: Berg, 2006)., 
99-124. 
15
  See, James Q. Whitmann (notes 2 and 4). 
16
  For the historical realization that consumers were placed at a bargaining disadvantage within 
contractual relationships, see, M. Everson, ‘Legal Constructions of the Consumer’ (note 14). 
17
  See, Whitman (note 2), on the emancipatory powers of a notion of consumption, which allows the 
nature of ‘valued goods’ to be established by consumers rather than producers. Alternatively, social 
prejudices are overcome as traditional production complexes must cede to a real world social demand, 
which better reflects the needs and desires of once disadvantaged social groups. 
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from the simple fact that the US is also the cradle of a notion of ‘consumer protection’, 
which often places the status of the sovereign consumer in doubt; 18  sovereign 
consumption sitting uneasily aside the paternalistic mores of interventionist consumer 
protection. It was thus President John F. Kennedy, who, in the wake of the thalidomide 
crisis, began to encourage law and lawyers to review their age-old refusal to regard 
consumers as a distinct class, requiring special legal protection.19 
Thalidomide cruelly exposed the myth that the modern industrial economy might 
simply be viewed as a forum for egalitarian economic exchange. By the 1960s, 
economic exchange was instead characterised by large-scale imbalance in the relative 
bargaining powers of producers and consumers of goods. Above all, thalidomide 
revealed wide-ranging disjunction between the profit motive that drove modern 
production and the legitimate interests and concerns of consumers in the safety of 
consumer goods. The time had come for the re-evaluation of the place of the consumer 
within national society, and, with this, for the reconsideration of the underlying notion 
that unfettered exchange could per se sustain an egalitarian and ‘just’ society: 
[T]he consumer is no longer seen merely as a purchaser and user of goods and services for 
personal, family or group purposes but also as a person concerned with the various facets of 
society which might affect him directly or indirectly as a consumer.20 
Reproduced almost verbatim in a 1975 European Community policy statement on the 
legitimate nature of consumption, Kennedy’s sentiments directly addressed the 
dilemma of the conflicting identities and interests of modern consumers. Certainly, 
consumers possessed an interest in plentiful and cheap goods; however, as producers, 
workers, family members and simple national citizens, they also maintained a 
simultaneous interest in the sustainable production of safe goods, which were also 
produced with due respect for the legitimate concerns of the workforce and society as a 
whole. Immediate public outrage had coalesced into a demand from prompt regulatory 
intervention into the modes of production, in order to counterbalance a ‘freedom to 
consume’ with a notion of ‘freedom from harm’. Accordingly, ‘explicit’ legal 
recognition was to be given to the notion of the ‘consumer’, as purchasers of goods and 
services were to be regarded less as free and creative economic agents, and more as 
economic subjects in need of a degree of interventionist protection. At the same time, 
however, this new and distinct class of ‘consumer’ was also to be promptly reintegrated 
with within more modern perceptions of the nature and the role of the national citizen. 
Most strikingly, and within the context of European welfare states, the shift in emphasis 
from an isolated ‘freedom to consume’ to an integrated conception whereby the state 
would act to ensure ‘freedom from harm’ (be the danger of harm one that was posed to 
consumer, worker, producer or simple citizen), accordingly formed the backdrop for a 
new legal encounter with the ‘citizen-consumer’. Consumption could not and would not 
be viewed as an autonomous act. Instead, consumption would be regulated in the light 
                                                          
18
  See, for example, D. Bollier & J. Claybrook (note 8): the US notion of ‘consumer protection; has 
always proven to be a strong counterweight to unfettered consumerism. 
19
  D. Bollier & J. Claybrook (note 8), p. 31 on the full details of Kennedy’s consumer protection 
programme. 
20
  EEC Council Resolution on a ‘Preliminary Programme for a Consumer Protection and Information 
Policy, OJ 1975 C 92/1. 
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of the shared concerns of the citizens of the nation state. The state, the representative of 
the joint interests of its own citizens, might consequently intervene widely in order to 
regulate the economy, using its own national legal order to determine the exact 
parameters within which consumption might now occur. 
The egalitarianism of the post-war welfare state within Europe, which secured the 
equality of its own citizens through large-scale redistribution (either directly through 
taxation, or indirectly, by means, say, of requiring industry to bear the costs of 
interventionist economic regulation) was, in part, facilitated by a heightened belief in 
the sustainability of theories of economic organisation, informed to a greater or lesser 
degree by corporatist impulses.21 At the same time, however, it also necessitated a re-
evaluation of the legitimate bases of national law. Where once the formal legal order 
had derived its own internal legitimacy from its ability to impose one universal and pre-
political framework of legal norms upon society, the law of the welfare state now 
demanded (in the interest of substantive equality) that law cede to purposive political 
direction, in order to treat different groups within society in different ways. The 
consumer would henceforth be recognised as a distinct class of citizen in need of 
particular protection. At the same time, however, the needs and interests of consumers 
would also be balanced against the needs and interests of the entire population, as 
workers, producers and family members. 
Legal encounters with the ‘citizen-consumer’ are accordingly marked by a high degree 
of what Max Weber was to term, ‘legal materialisation’. In stark contrast to the formal 
legal notion of the ‘sovereign-consumer’, the citizen consumer entails a series of 
positive values, which cannot be legitimated by a simple internal legal dedication to the 
maintaining of contractual autonomy, but must instead find their approbation in 
democratic discourse and the subjection of law to subsequent political direction. With 
this, individual national legal notions of the ‘citizen-consumer’ are necessarily 
distinguishable from one another, as each political community chooses which social 
concerns will be addressed in which particular manner; at the same time, however, such 
distinctions are necessarily intensified as the law has always struggled to translate 
political values coherently into the whole of a national legal order – as Max Weber also 
warned, material law is far from perfect, prone to its own ‘irrationality’ as purposive 
political direction tears apart the coherence and autonomy of formal legal structures of 
reasoning. 
Inconsistency thus inevitably arises given the varied identities of its citizenry (as 
workers, consumers, producers etc..); no one national political community is constant in 
the impulses and directions that it sends its legal order. Just as the seemingly 
‘consumerist’ US legal order is also prone to contradiction between consumerist and 
consumer protection goals, individual European polities often send contradictory 
messages on the legitimate nature of consumption within society to the varied sections 
of its own legal order (consumer law, competition law, labour law and economic 
                                                          
21
  See, for the full impact of corporatist theories of economic regulation upon European legal orders (as 
well as their status as barrier to the evolution of the integrated European market), G. Majone, 
Dilemmas of European Integration: The Ambiguities & Pitfalls of Integration by Stealth (Oxford: 
Oxford UP, 2005). 
 Michelle Everson and Christian Joerges 
 10 
regulation). 22  Equally, however, individual national notions of the ‘sovereign-
consumer’ are often also strangely incomplete and inconsistent as material law betrays 
its own lack of comprehensive steering capacity’, both proving itself unable to 
overcome perennial conflict between the goals of competition, consumer and labour 
law, and further tending (or in part at least) to a recidivistic belief in the legitimating 
powers of a legal formalism, to whom the ‘paternalistic’ notion of a citizen-consumer 
cannot but be an anathema: contract law, in particular, often remains in thrall to earlier 
formal notions of legal legitimacy and is often still predicated upon the assumption that 
parties to the contract retain an autonomous bargaining power.23 
Taken together, the contradictions and conflicts that can be identified within any one 
effort to define the legitimate (redistributive) parameters of consumption might 
accordingly be argued to create one very particular dilemma within modern legal 
encounters with the citizen-consumer: the citizen-consumer is not only an elusive 
character, a victim of the lack of coherent steering capacity within material law, but is 
also inexorably embedded within and shaped by individual national legal orders, 
creating a very particular barrier to transnational trade and consumption. In other words, 
each particular bundle of compromises and contradictions that underpin each national 
body of contract law, labour law, competition law and consumer protection law, 
represents its own highly idiosyncratic barrier to trade (or a foreign producer transaction 
cost) across national borders.  
As a consequence, and, particularly within the setting of the European Union, legal 
encounters with the citizen-consumer are, as we shall see below, now marked by a 
heightened degree of friction, as a partial EU legal order dedicated to the creation of an 
integrated European market begins to sweep national regulatory laws away. 
Nonetheless, as the WTO GMO case readily demonstrates, the ideal-type concept of the 
‘citizen-consumer’ is still present within Europe, and, indeed, seems to have been 
strengthened in one very important modern respect: where the post-war European 
concept of the citizen-consumer was, by and large, shaped and formed by utilitarian 
efforts to overcome class distinctions (between workers, producers and consumers), a 
modern European emphasis on the maintaining of democratically-informed regulation 
over the building blocks of agricultural and foodstuffs production, is not simply 
concerned with heightened consumer protection (precautionary risk regulation), but is 
also reflective of a desire to incorporate the ethical concerns of European citizens 
within the modern economy. 
Alternatively, the notion of the ‘citizen-consumer’ still retains its inspirational quality. 
The democratic will and effort to predetermine the nature of consumption, to define the 
parameters of the economy in which it occurs, is not simply a matter of European trade 
intransigence – or the blind protection of traditional or artisan means of production – 
but is (also) an inspirational effort to ensure that all affected views, opinions and 
interests on the legitimate nature of consumption should be translated into a shared 
European conception of the normative good of consumption. 
                                                          
22
  See, for the full details of the contradictory political impulses sent to each section of the national legal 
order (and subsequent difficulties in co-ordinating the national legal order), M. Everson ‘Legal 
Constructions of the Consumer’ (note 14).  
23
  See, for full details Ch. Joerges (note 12). 
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Legal Proceduralism and the ‘Enabled Consumer’ 
Our final legal encounter with an ‘ideal-type’ consumer cannot be exemplified through 
broad brush stroke reference to any one national legal order. Instead, the ‘enabled 
consumer’ can only be found fleetingly within the writings of various legal theorists,24 
and must likewise be understood to form a part of a legal response to a very particular 
dilemma of legal legitimacy. 
As we have seen within our analysis of both the sovereign-consumer and the citizen 
consumer, legal encounters with the consumer are often marked by contradiction, 
complexity, the economic or political manipulation of law, as well as, an underlying 
crisis within the notion of the legitimacy of law. Thus, on the on hand, formal legal 
orders might find their legitimacy within their apolitical nature; their ability to apply 
universal legal norms of legal autonomy to all individuals, regardless of status. 
Nonetheless, where the precepts of classical or neo-classical theory are placed in doubt, 
and real-world imbalances in political, social or economic power are recognised, the 
overall sustainability and legitimacy of the law of the sovereign consumer cannot but be 
placed in doubt: what price the power to define my own ethnic, religious or gender 
identity by means of consumption if I cannot guard myself against the irreparable harms 
posed by a profit-driven market’s systemic disregard for scientific uncertainty? By the 
same token, however, as Max Weber rightly warned, material legal orders are subject to 
their own inconsistencies and irrationalities – in particular, as the purposive values 
underlying them inevitably vary over time and space – the currently most pressing of 
which, is surely the inability of material law to reach beyond the boundaries of imputed 
(national) political community, in order to take account of values, interests and 
concerns that might not necessarily find their place within the (forever contradictory) 
national concept of the ‘citizen-consumer’. 
To lawyers engaged in the eternal waltz between formal and material conceptions of 
law – the chimera of apolitical and autonomous formal legal legitimacy and the 
irrational dedication of law to a forever elusive political claim to have identified 
immutable social values – the struggle to identify the legitimate bases of law is an 
existential one, and, within the specific context of legal encounters with the act of 
consumption, leads to a conclusion that the law should never claim to have identified 
one final and ‘legitimate’ ideal-type consumer. The process of legal transformation of 
the act of consumption into a normative good of consumption is not one that can be 
satisfactorily performed through simple recourse to panacea of sovereign purchasing 
power; nor is it one that can be said to have been performed by means of the 
subordination of law to one political, economic or social set of consumption values. 
Instead, the only sustainable source of legitimacy that might be identified for law 
during its encounters with the consumer is procedural in nature. Law should not and, 
fortunately enough, cannot pre-determine the normative good of consumption. Instead, 
it can only ever act to attempt to ensure that the social, economic and political 
parameters within which each individual act of consumption occurs have been drawn 
                                                          
24
  See, for example, Ch. Joerges (note 12) and id., ‘Quality Regulation in Consumer Goods Markets: 
Theoretical Concepts and Practical Examples’, in T. Daintith & G. Teubner (eds.), Contract and 
Organization (Berlin: deGruyter, 1986), pp.142-163. 
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up, and are continually re-drawn up, with due regard for each and every interest, 
individual and concern upon whom the act of consumption impacts. 
Procedural law is the law of political discourse; an open-ended law, which founds its 
legitimacy in the fact that substantive values are not the product of law, but rather the 
product of the political discourse which law enables and facilitates. As noted, 
procedural law is largely the product of legal theory minds and can only be identified in 
a real world of consumption in very limited circumstances. 25  Nonetheless, and at 
national level, procedural conception of enabled consumption have always been 
recognised and may yet find their true applicative value at supranational and 
transnational level. 
 
 
3. The Consumer in Post-national Constellations 
‘Markets are always socially embedded’. It is easily possible and in our context 
particularly useful to reconstruct the consumer’s encounters with the foregoing three 
paradigms in Polanyian terms.26 Formal, materialized and proceduralised law are all 
only different modes of ‘instituting’ the economy. Certainly, legal formalism does this 
only so indirectly that it is often equated with the assumptions of classical laissez-faire 
economics. And yet, the master thinker of formalism knew more: ‘formal’ and non-
formal elements are both simultaneously present in modern legal systems; the former 
does cannot perform without the latter.27 We need not engage in an exegesis of Weber’s 
brief and somewhat cryptic observations.28 The turn to materialization and the present 
concern with proceduralisation are responses to the irreversible technological and 
economic changes to which all democratic constitutional states were required to 
develop deliberate political and legal responses. We can therefore feel ourselves on safe 
ground when interpreting ‘materialization’ and ‘proceduralisation’ as modes of social 
embeddedness. What we cannot be so sure about, however, is the impact of 
Europeanisation and globalisation on these accomplishments.29 No commentators argue 
that the ‘social embeddedness’ of the European market has been set aside by the 
dynamics of market integration and our survey will argue that the analytical categories 
we have employed in the national constellation retain much of their analytical strength 
                                                          
25
  See, for instance, the efforts of Norbert Reich to identify cases in which consumer interests groups are 
included within the process of industrial production, Europäisches Verbraucherrecht, 3rd ed., Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 1996. 
26
  K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (1944)                                                                                                                                                                          
Boston: Bacon Press 1992, esp. at pp. 45-58, 71-80; cf. the explanatory remarlks by Fred Block, ibid., 
pp. xxiii-xxv.  
27
  M. Weber, Rechtssoziologie (note 10). 
28
  See Duncan Kennedy, ‘The Disenchantment of Logically Formal, Legal Rationality: Or Max Weber’s 
Sociology in the Genealogy of the Contemporary Mode of Western Legal Thought’, in Ch. Camic, 
Ph.S. Gorski, and D.M. Trubek (eds.), Max Weber's Economy and Society: A Critical Companion, 
Stanford, CA : Stanford University Press, 2005, pp. 322-365, esp. at pp. 338-342. 
29
  ‘Embedded liberalism’ is a notion developed by Gerald Ruggie and other which is related tzo our 
topic but also distinct becazue it is concerned with theb behaviour of states; see, for a recent analysis J. 
Steffek, Embedded Liberalism and its Critics, New York: Pagrave Macmillan 2006. 
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and normative plausibility at EU level. Similarly, it would be naïve to expect that 
globalised market can function without institutionalised mechanisms that ensure the 
trust of consumers in the reliability and safety of the goods that free international trade 
seeks to offer. Post-national constellations, however, do exhibit differentiae specificae, 
the most important of which are the lack of those tools that nation states had at their 
disposal to ensure the social embeddedness of their economies and the difficulties of 
organising transnational political processes which might act as functional equivalents. 
These differences and difficulties are more obvious at the international than at the 
European level. We therefore deal with both levels of governance separately.  
 
A) The European Constellation: the Rule of Law on Trial? 
It has become common30 within the legal reconstruction of the integration process to 
distinguish between the formative ‘integration through law’ era under the guidance of 
European Court of Justice, which was then followed by a very dynamic 15 year period 
characterised in its turn by the effort to complete the internal market, the strengthening 
of European competitiveness and the adaptation of EU competences and decision-
making rules to the functional necessities of these new ambitions. The first two eras are 
relatively easily captured within our paradigms. It is only in the third (current) 
integration phase, encompassing the effort to democratise the integration project, that 
the challenges of the post-national constellation have become more fully apparent.  
Modest beginnings 
European Integration was deliberately conceived of as an economic project. However, 
at the time of its launch, each of the EEC Member States of the EEC had already 
transformed themselves into social or welfare states and were in possession of 
institutionalised ‘mixed economies’. 31  This is why tensions between the European 
‘level of governance’ – characterized by the recognition of economic freedoms, a 
commitment to open markets, and very limited competences – and the national level, at 
which the nation states retained political powers to organize their economic and social 
affairs as they saw fit, were inevitable. Fritz W. Scharpf32 was to conceptualise this 
division between national competences in the realm of social policies and the 
institutionalisation of market building competences at European (Community) as a 
decoupling of ‘interdependent’ policy spheres. Nonetheless, this problem remained 
latent for nearly two decades. In the field of consumer policy, this is easy explained. 
                                                          
30
  Following J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (1991), in id., The Constitution of Europe. 
“Do the new clothes have an emperor”?, Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1999, pp. 3-101; see also Ch. 
Joerges & M. Everson, ‘Law, economic and politics in the constitutionalization of Europe’, in E.O. 
Eriksen, J.E. Fossum & A.J. Menéndez, Developing a Constitution for Europe, London-New York: 
Routledge 2004, pp. 162-179 and Ch. Joerges, .’What is left of the European Economic Constitution? 
A melancholic eulogy, European Law Review 30 (2005), 461-489 
31
  See Jacques Pelkmans’ earlier work, e.g., Market Integration in the European Community (Den Haag: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1984); he does no longer use the term later, but does not loos sight of the 
problematic, e.g. when analyzing the ‘small social acquis of the Union’ in his European Integration. 
Methods and Economic Analysis (Heerlen: Longman, 1997), pp. 248 ff. 
32
  F.W. Scharpf, ‘The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity’ (2002) 40 
Journal of Common Market Studies 645, 646. 
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Consumer protection was of very marginal importance in Europe’s post war economies 
and started to gain some momentum only in the 1970s.33 
Once it did, however, Europe entered upon the scene. In the mid 70s, the European 
Commission adopted its first ambitious consumer policy programme34 This programme 
was also innovative in that it relied upon a mechanism which was to become extremely 
important two decades later. Invoking a ‘soft law’ mechanism (‘communication’) for its 
new policy, the Community compensated for the fact that it had no genuine powers or 
competences in the field it had now entered. ‘Hard law’ measures were, nevertheless, 
also on the agenda, and were often presented as a means of overcoming distortion of 
competition and obstacles to the completion of the common market, in an effort to 
overcome any national sensibilities which could be used to block European regulation 
under the unanimity voting requirements of the then Article 100 EEC Treaty. However, 
following the trend to (qualified) majority voting, ushered in by the 1987 Singe 
European Act, as well as the introduction of Article 100(a), guaranteeing a ‘high level 
of protection’ for European consumers, the status of European consumer policy was 
inevitably strengthened. Further, the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 endowed the European 
Union with clearer competences. Nationally embedded concepts of the consumer and 
the national regulatory programmes that sustained them were exposed to the 
rationalising gaze of the demand that all barriers to trade within the Community be 
dismantled. Primary European law, though not inherently concerned with visions of the 
consumer, was thus forced not only to confront embedded national attitudes to 
consumer law and culture, but also ‘explicitly’ to investigate the character and nature of 
the European consumer in order to justify its deregulatory interventions. 
Ambitious Endeavours 
In all accounts of the integration project, the Delors Commission’s ‘White Paper on 
Completion of the Internal Market’ of 1985 35  figures as a turning point and 
breakthrough. After years of stagnation, the integration project developed a new 
dynamic – thanks to the well-chosen focus of all political energies. The programme was 
presented and widely perceived of as a confirmation of Europe’s commitment to 
economic efficiency through market building. However, what had started out as a 
collective effort to strengthen Europe’s competitiveness and accomplish this objective 
through new (de-regulatory) strategies soon led to the entanglement of the EU in ever 
more policy fields and the development of an ever more sophisticated regulatory 
machinery.36 In particular, the concern of the European legislator and the Commission 
                                                          
33
  See G. Trumbull, Consumer Capitalism (note 2), pp. 8 ff. 
34
  OJ 1975 C 92/1. This initiative was clearly inspired by President John F. Kennedy’s famous and 
much older message (see Public Papers of the U.S., John F. Kennedy, Containing the Public 
Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President, Jan. 1-Dec. 31 1962, 235-243). The Community 
adopted the rights rhetoric of that message promising to Europe’s market citizens a right to the 
protection of health and safety; a right to the protection of their economic interests; a right of redress; 
a right to information and education; a right of representation. 
35
  Commission of the EC, ‘Commission White Paper to the European Council on Completion of the 
Internal Market’, COM(85) 310 final of 14 June 1985. 
36
  For a no longer up-to-date but still impressively comprehensive comprehensive account, see V. 
Eichener, Entscheidungsprozesse in der regulativen Politik der Europäischen Union (Opladen: Leske 
& Budrich, 1997). 
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with ‘social regulation’ (health and safety of consumers and workers, and 
environmental protection) proved to be irresistible.  
What consequences did this have for European law’s understanding of and position on 
the issue of consumption? It had become uncontroversial that ‘high standards of 
protection’ should form an element within European markets and the European ‘social 
model’. Seemingly, the materialisation paradigm, together with ‘purposive’ regulatory 
programming had been transferred from the national to the European level.37  That 
impression, however, was to be of breve durée. Europeanisation under the guidance of 
Jacques Delors’ White Paper had been a modernising initiative with many innovative 
impacts. To expect that this initiative would be a European cure to the failures 
experienced during interventionist programming at national level was at best naïve. At 
the national level, the response to these failures had been ‘proceduralisation’; Europe 
was bound to follow suit, but inevitably lacked the plethora of institutions and dense 
communicative practices within which proceduralisation was embedded in national 
societies. The alternative it chose was officiously announced in 2001 in the White paper 
on Governance.38 We now turn to that new trend. 
Between De-formalisation of Community Rule and a New Austerity of Economic 
Liberalism 
It is by no means accidental that the European turn to ‘governance’ was triggered by the 
scandalous malfunctioning of Europe’s regulatory machinery, which caused great 
anxieties amongst Europe’s market citizens and therefore propelled consumer policy, 
for so long the poor relation of integration policy, into the arena of high politics.39 The 
internal market had been visibly politicised, the economy had mutated into a polity. 
Through its turn to governance Europe sought to meet these challenges. 
The White Paper defined governance as ‘rules, procedures and behaviour, that affect the 
way in which powers are exercised at European level - particularly regarding, openness, 
participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence’. 40  This definition 
summarises the intense preparatory work of the ‘Governance Team’, a group composed 
of Commission officials under the leadership of Jérôme Vignon, a close collaborator of 
the Jacques Delors. 41  The intensive European-wide resonance which the new 
programmatic provoked42 was easily explained. The turn to governance was a clear 
necessity. The BSE crisis was but one of the many challenges Europe had to respond to. 
The effectiveness of the ‘integration through law’ paradigm, characterised by the 
                                                          
37
  See, Ch. Joerges & M. Everson (note 30), , at pp.167 ff. 
38
  Commission of the European Communities, ‘European Governance. A White Paper’, COM(2001) 
428 final of 25.07.01. 
39
  See, on this background Ch. Joerges, ‘Law, Science and the Management of Risks to Health at the 
National. European and International Level – Stories on Baby Dummies, Mad Cows and Hormones in 
Beef’, 7 (2000) Columbia Journal of European Law, pp. 1-19 at 6 ff.. 
40
  (Note 38), p. 8, note 1. 
41
  See ‘Enhancing democracy in the European Union. Working Programme’, SEC (200) 1547, 7 final of 
11.10.2000; http://europa.eu.int/comm/governance/work/en.pdf; see also O. De Schutter, N. Lebessis 
& J. Paterson (eds.), Governance in the European Union (Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the EC, 2001). 
42
  The most recent bibliography on governance I am aware of lists 2.900 books and journal articles; 
available at http://www.connex-network.org/govlit . 
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Commission’s monopoly over legislative proposals that were then adopted by the 
Council after consultation with the European Parliament, had long been eroded. The 
‘turn to regulation’ that the 1985 White Paper had begun still lacked an appropriate 
institutional and political framework. What Europe now needed was the continuous 
management of its political economy; by the same token, however, it still lacked a 
central and genuinely European administration and was accordingly required to 
strengthen its co-ordination of European and national governmental and non-
governmental actors. The turn to governance was accordingly inevitable; but what did 
this move accomplish? 
Seen through the lenses of legal paradigms that we have used throughout this essay one 
trend is particularly strong in the ‘classical’ field of consumer protection within private 
law. Here the Commission appears to be moving back to the liberal beginnings of 
European consumer legislation in the 1970s. Very shortly after it had announced in its 
2003 ‘action plan’ on European contract law,43 the Commission explained that it would 
prioritise a consolidation of the patchwork of European consumer protection 
directives. 44  Most significantly in the context of the present ‘citizenship and 
consumption project’ is the Directive 2005/29 ‘concerning unfair business-to-consumer 
commercial practices’,45  the consumer is again constructed as a market actor with 
economic interests whose ‘transactional’ performance European law seeks to further 
thus promoting the ‘smooth functioning of the internal market’.46 The same orientation 
is strongly visible in the an important initiative the Commission has recently presented, 
namely the draft directive on consumer credit47 – and recent judgments of the ECJ point 
in the same neo-neo-liberal direction.48 
What is true in the field of contractual consumer legislation, however, cannot be true 
for protection against risks to health and safety. It is not possible to treat Europeans as 
‘shoppers’ where they are anxious about their health and unwilling to consume 
genetically modified food. Within the health and safety arena, we can accordingly 
identify what appear to be counter-currents. Consumer health and safety concerns are 
pursued with great energy. The recently established European Food Safety Authority 
provides a telling example. According to its founding statute ‘[i]t is necessary to ensure 
that consumer confidence and the confidence of trading partners is secured through the 
open and transparent development of food law’ [preamble (22)]49. This would seem to 
indicate that the authority has nothing to do with politics, or with the control over the 
market by the consumer, but is rather, in a technocratic market driven logic, designed to 
                                                          
43
  Communication from the Commission. A More Coherent European Contract Law: An Action Plan 
COM(2003) 68 final of 12.02.2003. 
44
  First Annual Progress Report on European Contract Law and the Acquis Review. COM(2005) 456 
final of 23.09.2005 
45
  OJ L 148, 22 of 11 June 2005. 
46
  Ibid., recital 3. 
47
  See the Modified Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on credit 
agreements for consumers amending Council Directive 93/13/EC, COM(2005) 483 final of 
07.10.2005. 
48
  Recent examples include: Case C-481/99, Heininger, ECR 2001, I-234 (unfair contract terms) and 
Case C-402/03, Skov, Judgment of 10/1/2006, nyr (product liability law). 
49
  Article 37(1) of Regulation 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ 2002 L 
31/16. 
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secure the position of the consumer (rather than citizen) within the market. Equally, this 
technocratic logic would seem to be confirmed by the statute’s to principles of scientific 
neutrality: The members of the Scientific Committee and the Scientific Panels [of the 
EFSA] shall undertake to act independently of any external influence.50 However, such 
stark strictly executive attributes must immediately be contrasted with an envisaged role 
for the agency’s technocrats that is to be exercised as follows: 
The members of the Management Board, the Advisory Forum and the Executive Director 
[of the EFSA] shall undertake to act independently in the public interest.51 
The notion of ‘in the public interest’ provides the key: the embedding of Europe’s 
agencies not only within a technocratic market driven logic, but also within a sphere of 
conflicting political interests. The distinction made in the design of European agencies 
between ‘political’ decision-making functions, undertaken by the Commission, and 
strict technocratic activities, delegated to bureaucrats and scientific expertise, is a false 
one. More importantly, it is seen to be a false one: the direct connection made between 
the agency and European public, the notion of executive functions exercised in a 
European public interest, tears away the veil of technocratic governance in Europe. 
Europe is no more simply dedicated to a clear purposive and supreme programme of 
technocratic intervention than it is to pursuit of a clear and comprehensive programme 
of legislative intervention on the basis of a unitary and representatively expressed 
democratic will. Instead, its agencies – the supposed core of its technocratic orientation 
– are shot through with political conflict and consideration, i.e., conflict and 
consideration that requires some form of reconnection between it’s executive arm and a 
sphere of political contention in which legitimate political interests are formed. 
Scientification and the centralisation of scientific advice are very visible characteristics 
of the present developments within European risk regulation. The strengthening of 
European policies goes hand in hand with a reliance on new – and increasingly de-
formalised – modes of governance. The distinctive feature o f these regulatory 
techniques is their reliance upon ‘soft law’ and their substitution for law’s normative 
stubbornness with flexible management coupled with cognitive openness. The turn to 
expertise and flexible managerial responses seems, albeit only at first sight, at odds with 
the contemporaneous return of orthodox formalism in the realm of contract law. There 
is, however, no paradox and no contradiction within the perspective of the politicised 
consumer: legal formalism in contract law tends to replace political contestation over 
the social dimensions of private ordering with the objective mechanisms of market 
processes. The new modes of flexible expert governance tend to replace political 
contestation over socially acceptable exposure to risks by references to the objective 
standards of sound science. ‘Sound science and the market’ are natural allies. 
Is this a normatively convincing and stable alliance? The present policy orientation of 
the European Commission has undoubtedly been imposed upon it by the failure of the 
Draft Constitutional Treaty. This failure had a destructive impact on the cohesion of the 
Union and, understandably so, also on the confidence of its exponents in the 
sustainability of their endeavours. The resort to ‘sound science and the market’ is 
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therefore quite comprehensible. It is, however, also unlikely to confirm or restore the 
acceptance of Europe by its consumers – and it is by no means comprehensive and 
incontestable. The new formalism in private law remains embedded in mature legal 
systems, which have learned to live with competing rationalities and politicised 
consumers. The turn to sound science and expert management in the realm of health 
and safety is embedded in European-wide communicative networks amongst politically 
accountable actors and an ever more active civil society. The transformation of the 
European consumer into a citizen is still underway. 
 
B) Globalisation as Regression: The WTO Panel Report on the GMO Dispute 
Turning back to Karl Polanyi’s thesis, we can now conclude that European consumer 
markets have not currently found their own final ‘social embeddedness’ within the 
dense legal structures originally foreseen for the internal market. At the same, however, 
the historical ‘integration through law’ legacy has not fully dissolved, nor can or will 
European markets be fully ‘dis-embedded’ by virtue of any new and austere economic 
liberalism or the erosion of rule of law by new modes of governance. The international 
constellation is, nonetheless, very different. Even though we might expect a social-
embeddedness imperative to operate at international level, here, its powers will 
necessarily be of a very different kind. Of necessity, international contracting has 
created its own legal frameworks for international trade;52 frameworks within which 
national and European efforts to defend the health and safety of citizens have already 
proven to be powerful irritants and transformative accelerants. 
This trend is most visibly demonstrated in relation to the transformation of the old 
GATT trade regime into the new WTO legal system. The main objective of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), concluded 1947, was the reduction of tariffs 
introduced by states to protect their national economy. Since the early 1970s, however, 
non-tariff barriers to free trade have become the main focus for attention. This shift was 
necessitated by the intensification of domestic economic regulation, especially in the 
fields of health and safety, consumer and environmental protection (period of legal 
materialization). In 1994, the international trade system adapted to this situation by 
transforming the GATT into the World Trade Organization (WTO). The most important 
reforms included an overhaul of its procedures of dispute settlement and the conclusion 
of special agreements concerning non-tariff barriers to free trade such as the Agreement 
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and the Agreement 
on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). These agreements aim at the balancing of their 
main economic objective, free trade, with the domestic regulatory concerns of WTO 
members.  
There are obvious parallels to the European experience after the abolition of tariff 
barriers. But there are also important differences. The Members of the WTO did not 
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confer ‘positive’ regulatory powers upon that organisation, although they agreed that 
WTO law should impose restraints on the exercise of their domestic regulatory powers. 
WTO law cannot simply copy the European turn to ‘positive’ integration via-re-
regulation. The co-originality of market and regulation, postulated by Polanyi, must 
find its expression within different mechanisms. Currently, the most important of these 
mechanisms that accompany the restraints imposed on domestic regulatory policies is 
an intense process of quasi-legal norm-production at the international level, organised 
by both non-governmental and governmental actors, and especially so in the field of 
product safety.53 
The GMO Case and its Object 
As indicated, we will restrict our discussion on the impact of globalisation on the 
position of consumers to one single case, namely the dispute between the EU, the US, 
Canada and Argentina on the legitimate or otherwise use of genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) in foodstuffs.54  There are many reasons for this specific focus. 
Foodstuffs are highly politicised products; accordingly, no legal system has ever been 
able fully to dispense with more or less comprehensive or stringent regulatory 
supervision over them. GMOs represent the technologically most advanced and, at the 
same time, most controversial of all foodstuffs, if not of all consumer products. This is 
so for a broad range of reasons. 55  GMO production requires highly developed 
technologies, within which the US is the world’s leader, but which have also been 
mastered to a greater or lesser degree by countries such as Argentina, Brazil and India. 
The socio-economic implications of new GMO technologies are necessarily ambivalent: 
India, for example, with a high percentage of its labour force occupied within the 
agrarian sector, is a scene of great conflict about GMOs as development imperatives 
clash with employment concerns.56 The most intensive controversy, however, focuses 
on the risks of GMOs. Sceptics and GMO promoters agree to a large degree that the 
‘safety’ of genetically modified foodstuffs has not been ‘positively’ challenged.57 The 
main concern of the critics, however, is with the production process; the risks of 
contamination of non GMO-crops by GMOs released into the environment. The debate 
is also and in an illuminating way all about the importance of consumer anxieties and 
consumer choice. Do we have a ‘right to know’ what we are eating?58 Are governments 
entitled to require the labelling of GMOs because a majority or significant minority of 
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  See Ch.Joerges & E.-U.Petersmann (eds.) Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and Social 
Regulation, (Oxford: Hart 2006). 
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  See note 6 supra,. 
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  For a summary cf. the amicus brief submitted in the GMO dispute (note 6) by D. Winickoff, S. 
Jasanoff, L. Busch, R. Grove-White & B. Wynne, also published in 30 (2005) Yale Journal of 
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  See, S. Zarrilli, ‘International trade in GMOs: Legal frameworks and Developing Country Concerns’, 
in Italienerin in F Francioni & T. Scovazzi, Biotechnology and International Law, (Oxford: Hart 
2006), pp. 231-254. 
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  See, W. van den Daele, ‘Legal framework and political strategy in dealing with the risks of new 
technology — the two faces of the precautionary principle’, in J. Somsen (ed.), Regulating 
Biotechnology, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. forthcoming 2007). 
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  See, on this controversy P.H. Sand, ‘Labelling Genetically Modified Food: The Right to Know’ , 15:2 
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their constituency refuses to accept them?59 The EU has accordingly ‘perfected’ its 
authorization procedures by means of the establishment of an ethical advisory body.60 
The GMO controversy has a long history.61 The present legalized stage62 began in the 
spring of 2003 with the request for formal dispute settlement consultations by the US, 
supported by Argentina and Canada. In that request the complainants argued that the 
EC had imposed a de facto moratorium on approvals of biotech products and ‘national 
marketing and import bans on biotech products’ issued by Member States of the EU 
and approved by it. Following the request, the panel was formed in March 2004. Its 
report was announced several times and then postponed. The conclusions of the Panel’s 
preliminary report of 7 February 2006 were made public soon thereafter.63  Having 
received the responses to its preliminary report, the WTO panel published its modified 
report on 29 September 2006. It now covers 1087 pages and has10 annexes.64  
Three Core Issues 
The reasoning in WTO reports is highly formalized. The reports reconstruct the 
arguments of the parties to the disputes, of all other participants and of the amici curiae; 
they document how they have replied to their adversaries – and then take great pains to 
furnish a lege artis interpretation of the agreements on which they must base their 
findings and conclusions. There is of course much more in the reports than can be 
addressed here – but not everything is important in the light of the leitmotif of this 
essay: what form of social embeddedness of the market for GMOs does WTO law, in 
the view of the panel report, seek to achieve? 
The answers to this query seem surprisingly simple. We single out and differentiate 
between three aspects: (1) The authority of science; (2) the autonomy of politics and (3) 
consumer choice. 
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  See, ‘Europeans and Biotechnology in 2005: Patterns and trends’, 64.3 (2006) Eurobarometer; see 
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  See, P. Dabrowska, Hybrid solution for Hybrid Products? EU Governance of GMOs, Ph.D Thesis 
EUI Florence 2006, pp. 200 ff.  
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  G.C. Shaffer & M.A. Pollack, 'Reconciling (or Failing to Reconcile) Regulatory Differences: The 
Ongoing Transatlantic Dispute over the Regulation of Biotechnology', in D. Andrews, M.A. Pollack, 
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Economic Governance, (Florence: European University Institute 2005), pp. 167–229. 
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  See , for a detailed survey of the arguments brought forward by the parties, the intervenors and the   
E.-U. Petersmann, ‘ The WTO Dispute Over Genetically Modified Organisms: Interface Problems of 
International Trade Law, Environmental Law and Biotechnology Law’, in F Francioni & T. 
Scovazzi, .Biotechnology and International Law, (Oxford: Hart 2006), pp. 173-200. 
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  The full preliminary report was made public by Friends of the Earth (see http://www.foe.co.uk/ 
resources/press_releases/leaked_wto_report_us_misle_28022006.html) an indiscretion on which the 
final report (note 6 ) lamented upon at some length (see para.s 1.124-1.137). 
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  ‘European Communities – Measures affecting the approval and marketing of biotech products’ 
(DS291, DS292 and DS293). Findings and conclusions: http://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/dispu_e/291r_conc_e.pdf. Full panel report: http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/ 
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Supremacy of Science  
The US and the EU differ in their regulatory approaches to GMOs significantly in two 
respects. The US focuses on the health risks posed by the food produced whereas the 
approach of the EU is much more comprehensive in that it places a much greater 
emphasis on environmental risks.65 In their safety assessments, US authorities tend to 
approve products unless there is some scientific evidence confirming risk allegations, 
whereas the EU has committed itself to the ‘precautionary principle’. That principle has 
had constitutional authority within the EU since the Maastricht Treaty of 1992;66 each 
and every legislative, administrative and judicial act must respect it. The rules and 
principles governing the resolution of conflict between the two legal orders are to be 
found in the SPS Agreement. All of them point to the authority of science. That is by no 
means surprising.  
As already underlined, the WTO does not have any ‘positive’ legislative competences, 
but recognizes in principle the regulatory autonomy of WTO Members. In order to 
ensure the compatibility of regulatory policies with its commitment to free trade it 
makes use of underlying conflict of laws principles, asking Members to exercise some 
self-restraint in the interpretation and application of their domestic law and, where this 
does not suffice, seeking to resolve conflicts with the aid of a meta-rule to which all the 
parties can be expected subscribe. As such, WTO law reproduces the old European 
model to overcoming national regulatory policies that created obstacles to trade. 
Classically, the European model identified legitimate policy objectives for national 
regulation (such as health, safety and environmental protection) and then required 
member states to provide scientific evidence that these regulatory concerns were, in fact 
real.67 Through its resort to science, Europe invoked a non-partisan objective authority 
that national policy makers could accept. This is of course not to say that Europeans 
would not know that the assessment and risk management of risk involves political and 
policy questions such as the acceptability of risks and regulatory responses to them.68 
And yet, the standards of science as well as the techniques of risk assessment can claim 
some meta-political validity. Where scientists cannot agree, they nonetheless continue 
to interpret their controversies as a scientific exercise and entrust the scientific 
community with the competence to assess their claims.  
What has been practiced with such remarkable success within the EU suggests itself 
equally as a conflict mediating strategy in international arenas. The acceptability of 
technically complex and potentially harmful products cannot be assessed without the 
help of pertinent expertise. And vice versa: where WTO members raise objections 
against free access to their markets, they can be expected to provide scientific evidence 
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  See G.C Shaffer & M.A. Pollack (note 51), pp. 169 ff. 
66
  Now Article 174(2) EC Treaty. 
67
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supporting the legitimacy of their policies. This is exactly what the SPS Agreement 
provides for.69 
Nonetheless, a question remains: what if science cannot help to resolve controversies 
because scientists agree that they are confronted with uncertainty they cannot hope to 
overcome? This need not be the end of methodologically disciplined discourses. Such 
discourses have, however, come to an end, where one party adopts a version of the 
precautionary principle in which the quest for scientific evidence is rejected a priori. 
The borderlines are by no means obvious as the efforts of European Courts document. 70 
It would be too much to expect a WTO body to explain that its own mandate ends 
where science has no answers on offer. In the Hormones Case71 the WTO Appellate 
Body found that the ‘[precautionary] principle has not been written into the SPS 
Agreement as a ground for justifying SPS measures that are otherwise inconsistent with 
the obligations of Members set out in particular provisions of that Agreement.’ The 
panel in the GMO case follows suit in a more elegant way: Recalling ‘that according to 
the Appellate Body, the precautionary principle has not been written into the SPS 
Agreement as a legitimate ground for justifying SPS measures’;72 the panel went on to 
explain that ‘even if a Member follows a precautionary approach, its SPS measures 
need to be ‘based on’ (i.e., ‘-‘sufficiently warranted’ or ‘reasonably supported’ by) a 
risk assessment. Or, to put it another way, such an approach needs to be applied in a 
manner consistent with the requirements of Article 5 (1).’  
Alternatively, the WTO clearly feels entitled to impose the yardstick of science it finds 
in the SPS agreement regardless of the constitutional positions taken up and applied by 
its member states. 
Distorting Politics 
Resort to science in such trans-scientific matters is to invoke an emperor without 
clothes, one might object. If scientific uncertainty is a ‘fact’, the insistence on science 
as the legally prescribed arbiter of controversies does not make sense. A variety of 
alternatives are conceivable. The closest to the logic of the panel report is a broad 
understanding of ‘science’ and ‘risk assessment’. In the pronouncements of the 
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Appellate Body in the Hormones case just cited 73  the recognition of uncertainty 
resulting from incomplete knowledge and disputes between experts seems to mirror 
conservative interpretations of the precautionary principle. Thus, the ECJ in its most 
important judgment on the precautionary principle has explained that this principle 
must not be understood as legitimating ‘a purely hypothetical approach to risk, founded 
on mere suppositions which are not yet scientifically verified’;74 it requires instead ‘a 
risk assessment which is as complete as possible in the particular circumstances’.75 A 
second alternative is the extension of risk assessments to production processes and/or to 
their use. Both alternatives, however, imply that non-scientific criteria will have an 
impact on risk evaluations.76 Once one becomes aware of this implication it is difficult 
to explain why socio-economic considerations about the social costs and benefits of a 
new technology should be illegitimate per se. To rephrase this observation from a 
different perspective: since the legal system cannot refuse to take a decision simply 
because state of the art expertise does not provide it with guidance, the resort to trans-
scientific criteria must suggest itself. Socio-economic considerations concerning, for 
example, the impact of the introduction of new technologies on the agricultural sector 
are not simply irrational.77 
Two further implications need to be underlined. First, where uncertainty prevails, 
diversity in the assessment of the given problem will be unavoidable. Second, such 
diversity needs a framework within which it can be managed. The EU seems 
particularly well equipped in that respect. The ECT recognizes explicitly the right of 
Member states to move beyond the level of consumer protection foreseen in legislative 
acts (Article 95 (5) ECT; Article 153 ECT) and its commitment to precaution also 
suggests that in cases of scientific uncertainty the Member States should retain 
autonomy. Furthermore, each and every piece of pertinent secondary legislation 
contains safeguard clauses with exit options for Member States who find the majority 
response unacceptable (most significantly in the present context, the authorization of 
genetically modified organisms).78 
Diversity in a system understanding the establishment of a common market as it raison 
d’être is, however, apparently difficult to accept. Recourse to the safeguard identified 
by the ECJ is available only on the basis of ‘evidence which indicates the existence of a 
specific risk’ and not for reasons ‘of a general nature’. 79  The search for uniform 
standards within the European market is clearly visible in such remarks.80 The Court 
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confirmed that safeguard procedures must be understood in ‘in the light of the 
precautionary principle’ and may therefore justify a temporary derogation, but only, 
however, where ‘it proves impossible to carry out as full a risk assessment as 
possible … because of the inadequate nature of the available scientific data’.81  
And yet, what the European Court refused finally to do, was to subject European 
governments to an ‘objective’ standard, such as is advocated by the proponents of 
sound science. The WTO Panel, by contrast, was far less timid: notwithstanding doubts 
about the completeness of scientific evidence, the Panel insisted upon the exclusive 
validity of a yardstick, which, its indeterminacy notwithstanding, both overrules 
precautionary reservations in cases of uncertainty and de-legitimises political processes 
and solutions. If you cannot prove that GMOs are not safe, you have no reason to reject 
them. 
This final tendency, the de-legitimisation of political process, is very clear in the 
Panel’s treatment of European submissions. Europe’s final regulatory regime for GMOs 
did not appear out of the blue. Rather, it was many years in the making. The first 
directive appeared in 1990; 82  yet, in the light of on-going political debates and 
discussions, many revisions were to be made with the, the European Council of 
Environmental Ministers agreeing on a final common platform for a new framework 
only in June 1999.83 By the same token, the final regulatory directive took longer to 
detail. Although the WTO panel report did not question the seriousness of such lengthy 
political processes directly, it nonetheless found a very convenient and indirect means 
of de-legitimatising them. Having once decided that the SPS agreement was applicable 
to the authorization of GMOs, the panel could then point to Article 8 SPS Agreement in 
connection with Annex C 1 8a). These provisions require that applications must not be 
treated with ‘undue delay’. The right of applicants seeking authorization for their 
products trumps all other; it is irrelevant that time may be required to overcome internal 
political difficulties. The panel found that the completion of the approval process had 
been ‘unduly delayed’ in 24 cases. It therefore requested the EU to bring the measures 
‘into conformity with its obligations under the SPS Agreement’, effectively asking the 
EU to complete the approval process for the outstanding applications.  
Equally indirect and effective was the panel’s critique of the autonomy which Member 
States of the EU feel entitled to claim when resorting to ‘safeguard measures’. The 
national bans on the marketing and import of EU-approved biotech products imposed in 
France, Germany, Austria, Italy, Luxembourg and Greece were found to be 
incompatible with WTO law. This conclusion was based on the panel’s understanding 
of a proper handling of these measures under European law. The panel did not question 
the approval procedures, which allow individual EU member states to impose SPS 
measures that differ from EU-wide measures, but opined that, after the EU's scientific 
committee had already assessed the risks of the biotech products and judged them to be 
safe, the challenged EU member states had not undertaken risk assessments in line with 
the requirements of the SPS Agreement that would ‘reasonably support the prohibition’. 
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WTO law as specified in the risk assessment provisions of the SPS Agreement governs. 
National bans can be accepted only if based on an SPS-compliant risk assessment. 
‘Sound Science and the Market’ 
The opening of national markets is dependent on the establishment of transnational 
regimes ensuring the trustworthiness of free trade with complex and potentially 
hazardous products. This observation remains valid. The WTO panel report can be read 
as explicitly confirming that the market will always be ‘socially embedded’. The type 
of embeddedness the report advocates is, however, of a specific kind and the regulatory 
frameworks it is ready to endorse operate with a very limited mandate. The report 
recognizes implicitly the right to introduce new technologies. It follows that reasons 
must be given for restricting their introduction. Safeguarding important private and 
public goods, such as the health of consumers, are unquestioned. The restrictions 
imposed, however, need an objective basis - and science rather than politics provides 
the grounds on which restrictions can be based. The consumer can feel safe. He is not 
actively contributing, however, to his regulatory environment: ‘sound science’ is now 
the consumer’s guardian.  
How eill the epistemic community of WTO lawyers read the report. So far I am aware 
of just two, both critical, analyses.84 There will certainly be more. In the meantime, 
however, the EU has decided not to appeal the against panel report – with Commission 
Trade Spokesman Peter Power declaring “The impact of that judgment is entirely of 
historical interest”.85. Is the spokesman right? Karl Polanyi not only argued that the 
liberal project of a disembedded market is purely utopian; he also concluded that the 
disembedding of socially embedded markets cannot be successful.86  
                                                          
84
  O. Perez. “Anomalies at the Precautionary Kingdom: Reflections on the GMO Panel's Decision”, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=940907; Ch. Conrad, „Im 
Spannungsfeld von WTO-Recht und nationaler Sozialregulierung: Kritische Erörterung der 
Anwendbarkeit des SPS-Abkommens auf die Regulierung gentechnisch veränderter Produkte anhand 
des EC-Biotech-Streits“, Ms. Bremen 2006 (on file with author). 
85
  See, http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/eu-accepts-trade-ruling-gmos/article-159918. 
86
  This is at any rate how Fred Block interprets Polanyi’s argument (note 26), at. pp. xxv-xxvii.  
